Millett emphasized that machines, including Thaler's Creativity Machine, are considered tools under current law, not authors. She suggested that any changes to accommodate machine authorship should be addressed by Congress or the Copyright Office, as they could adapt laws if future advancements in artificial intelligence produce creative non-humans capable of being incentivized like humans.
Key takeaways:
- The judge emphasized that statutory construction requires more than finding a sympathetic dictionary definition, indicating that authors must be humans, not machines.
- The duration of copyright is tied to the author's lifespan, which is not applicable to machines as they do not have lives or spouses.
- The statute allows copyrights to be transferred to surviving spouses or children, and refers to authors' domiciles and nationalities, which machines do not possess.
- The court views machines as tools, not authors, and suggests that arguments for machine authorship should be directed to Congress or the Copyright Office.